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Supreme Court Docket No. 39591-2012 
____________ ) 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JAMES A. SCHILLER 
Magistrate Judge 
FOR THE APPELLANT: Matthew J. Roker 
LOVAN ROKER & ROUNDS, P.C. 
717 S. Kimball, Suite 200 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
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Idaho Attorney General 
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Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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The Right to Appeal Was Preserved With Stipulated Agreement Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
1 l(a)(2). 
Respondent argues that Appellant failed to preserve his right to appeal the denial of the 
motion to suppress prior to entering a plea of guilty. The Register Of Action Report provides 
that on March 21, 2011 a status conference was held where a stipulation for entry of plea 
pursuant to Rule 11 was entered with Defendant's written plea of guilty and the matter was set 
over for sentencing. The Caldwell City Prosecuting Attorney who Respondent now represents 
signed the stipulation reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. 
Appellant argues that the Register of Actions Report adequately supports the entry of a 
conditional plea of guilty reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. 
Appellant will also move to augment the record with the written Rule 1 l(a)(2) previously filed 
with the District Court. 
The Denial Of Appellant's Motion To Dismiss Should Be Reversed Because The "Community 
Caretaking Function" Is Not An Independent Exception To The Warrant Requirement. 
The Respondent asserts that the community caretaking function is one exception to the 4th 
Amendment's warrant requirement. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-8). The "community caretaking 
function" was first used to describe the duties of law enforcement officers as it relates to search 
and seizure by the United Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). The 
issue for the Cady Court's determination was whether the officers' warrantless search of the 
defendant's vehicle violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from the 
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unreasonable search and seizure of his car. Id. at 442. The Comt provided the following 
analysis: 
As a result of our federal system of government, however, state and local 
police officers, unlike federal officers, have much more contact with vehicles for 
reasons related to the operation of vehicles themselves. All States require vehicles 
to be registered and operators to be licensed. States and localities have enacted 
extensive and detailed codes regulating the condition and manner in which motor 
vehicles may be operated on public streets and highways. 
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also 
because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in 
an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving 
automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or 
office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may believe the operator 
has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be of that nature. Local 
police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents 
in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want 
of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, 
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence 
relating to the violation of a criminal statute. 
Id. at 441. 
The Court ultimately determined that the search of the defendant's vehicle was not 
unreasonable and, therefore, did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 
448. The importance of the Court's decision in Cady was not a finding that the "community 
caretaking function" of police officers is an exception to the warrant requirement. When using 
the term, the Court's discussion focused on the reasonableness of seizing and ultimately 
searching vehicles, not people. 
Later U.S. Supreme Court cases make clear that the Cady decision is not a foundation for 
a general "community caretaking" exception to the warrant requirement, but instead a part of the 
"inventory search" exception to the warrant requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364 (1976) (analyzing the history of the Court's precedent applying the Fourth Amendment 
to automobiles, including Cady, and finding that a routine search of a vehicle lawfully 
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impounded for a parking violation did not violate the Fourth Amendment.); see also Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (citing to Cady and Opperman, upholding an inventory search of a 
van seized after the driver was arrested for D .U .L as it was conducted pursuant to policy even 
though the officers had discretion whether to impound the vehicle.) 
Idaho precedent applying the "community caretaking function" has gone astray from the 
articulation given by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cady. In Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 
(1988), an officer saw a vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to a bar early in the morning with the 
headlights on, the engine running, and a person passed out in the driver's seat with his head 
slumped forward. The officer opened the vehicle's door, reached in, turned off the motor and 
took possession of the keys. Id. at 818. The Idaho Supreme Court cited Cady as precedent, and 
reasoned that the officer had a duty to investigate and that his actions were consistent with his 
caretaking function. Id. The Court failed to recognize that to justify the seizure under the 
community care taking function, such a seizure must be "totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Cady, 
413 U.S. at 441. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has found that when analyzing a seizure under the "community 
caretaking function," the court must look to the totality of the circumstances and determine 
"whether the intrusive action of the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding 
circumstances." State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754 (1997). While this line of reasoning seems 
to comport with U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the Fourth Amendment, the test 
later articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442, (Ct. App. 
2001), does not. In Deccio, police received an anonymous tip that a person was intoxicated, 
armed with a gun, and intending to kill himself. Id. at 443-44. A deputy spotted defendant's car 
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and followed. Id. at 444. The deputy did not observe any violations of traffic laws, but pulled 
the defendant over anyway. Id. The defendant was eventually arrested for D.U.I. Id. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Deccio stated that, "li]n order for the community 
caretaking function analysis to apply, an officer must possess a subjective belief that an 
individual is in need of immediate assistance, although the officer may harbor at least an 
expectation of detecting or finding evidence of a crime." Id. at 445. This analysis does not 
comport with the U.S. Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because under Cady, 
the community caretaking function justification must be totally divorced from any criminal 
investigation. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441. Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected any 
analysis of an officer's subjective beliefs and instead required the test for reasonableness be 
objective. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398,404 (2006). 
Appellant does not assert that police should always refrain from engaging m any 
investigation into an individual's welfare. However, police may not seize an individual, whether 
to investigate a crime or to investigate the person's welfare, unless the seizure was objectively 
reasonable. 
In the case of Appellant, it would have been reasonable for the officer to approach 
Appellant's vehicle and ask Appellant if he was alright. The Fourth Amendment is not 
implicated in such a consensual situation. Instead, the officer effectuated his overhead lights and 
immediately seized Appellant without having witnessed neither any violation of traffic laws, or 
any signs of distress from Appellant. Such intrusive action by police cannot be justified by the 
"community caretaking function" and all evidence obtained through the exploitation of an illegal 
seizure must be suppressed as a "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF -4 
Even If The "Community Caretaking Function" Is An Independent Exception To The Warrant 
Requirement. The Denial Of Appellant's Motion To Dismiss Should Be Reversed Because The 
Intrusive Action Of Officer Wade Was Not Reasonable In View Of All Surrounding 
Circumstances. 
The Respondent correctly asserts that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Idaho Courts 
recognize the community caretaking function as an exception to the warrant requirement that 
allows police officers to help individuals that officers believe are in need of immediate 
assistance. State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754 (1997). In determining whether a particular 
community caretaker-related contact justifies a detention, Idaho courts must analyze "whether 
the intrusive action of the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances." 
Id. (quoting State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1995). The reasonableness of an 
officer's actions under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement is to be 
tested upon practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act. State v. 
Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). The community caretaking function does not 
allow an officer to seize individuals where no serious harm is threatened. Id. at 825. 
Respondent asserts that the circumstances presented in In Re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 
(1988) are analogous to those presented in our case. In Clayton, as recited above, an officer 
opens the vehicle door to check on the driver who is passed out and slumped over the driver's 
wheel at 1:30 in the morning. Id. 818. The vehicle is located in a parking lot outside of a bar 
and the vehicle's engine is running. Id. The Court stated "[t]ested upon practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable persons act, this situation falls outside the boundaries of 
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normal conduct." Id. The Court ruled that under those circumstances there was a sufficient and 
objective basis for the officer to further investigate a D.U.I. Id. 
The circumstances in our case are easily distinguishable from those in Clayton. The 
officer in Clayton personally witnessed what appeared to be obvious exigent circumstances when 
he saw the defendant passed out. In our case, Officer Wade does not personally witness anything 
that would lead a person to believe that somebody needed aid, or that an ongoing emergency was 
at hand. The time of day was 5:30 P.M. and Appellant did not appear to be driving erratic or 
unlawfully while outside of a Walgreens'. Furthermore, the caller to 911 had informed dispatch 
that she had asked Appellant if he needed assistance and he had responded that he did not. There 
was nothing about Appellant's circumstances that fell outside the boundaries of normal conduct 
when Officer effectuated his overhead lights and seized Appellant. 
Respondent also asserts that the facts presented in State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Idaho 
App. 2006) provide an analogous scenario to the facts in our case. In Cutler, an ambulance 
responded to a report of an incoherent man sitting in the driver's seat of a diagonally parked 
vehicle in front of a closed store at 6:30 A.M. Id. at 300. After medical personnel determined 
that the defendant didn't need immediate medical assistance, they informed a responding officer 
that the defendant was extremely lethargic and then left the scene. Id. The responding officer 
then observed that a handgun was located inside the vehicle on a ledge, next to the driver's seat. 
Id. The officer then removed the gun, frisked the defendant for weapons, and after finding two 
pocket knives and a loaded magazine for the gun, he seized the defendant. Id. The Court 
concluded the officer's actions were justified by pointing to the facts the officer was aware of 
when he made the seizure: the defendant's extreme lethargy, the manner his vehicle was parked, 
and the presence of a handgun. Id. at 303. The Court also pointed out that the intrusion into the 
defendant's privacy was only minimally exceeded by the officer's decision to remain at the scene 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 6 
since his privacy interest had already been compromised by the emergency medical personnel's 
intrusion. Id. 
The factual scenario in our case is far different from that presented in Cutler. Once 
again, Officer Wade did not observe Appellant to be incoherent or to appear in any sort of danger 
when he arrived on scene. Medical personnel were never called to assist Appellant, nor was he 
in front of a closed store at odd hours. In Cutler, the officer had direct contact with medical 
personnel who told him of defendant's condition, where in our case Officer Wade only had a 
report of an elderly man who "seemed confused." Officer Wade did not witness anything that 
would substantiate the report himself before he made the seizure of Appellant. Also, there was 
no report or sign of any weapons in Appellant's vehicle. In Cutler, the intrusion into the 
defendant's privacy interest was relatively minor because of the presence of the medical 
personnel. Here, Appellant was abiding by all traffic laws with no outward appearance of 
distress and had previously denied the need for further assistance. The seizure was a major 
intrusion that cannot be justified by all surrounding circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant entered into a written Rule l l(a)(2) plea agreement with the prosecuting 
attorney that reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Further, as 
provided in the arguments provided above, the Magistrates Order denying the motion to suppress 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceeding. 
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DATED this 9h day of October, 2012. 
LOVAN ROKER & ROUNDS, P.C. 
r:i~4£ 
MATTHEW J. RO~ ~----=--= 
Attorney for Appellant 
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